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1.	Introduction

Our world usually evolves at the very edge of Chaos. This is its normal state. Its steady state, statisticians would say. Even a superficial knowledge of history leads to conclude that it has always been that way, and that it will most likely continue to be that way. That’s why professional investors, as opposed to traders, are not interested in discrete events, even if some of these might act as catalysts for the strategies they deploy on the markets. If you do not accept this state of the world, let me suggest that, instead of investing, you consider buying lottery tickets or playing slot machines.

Infrequently, but inevitably, unlikely successions of events happen, as in 2000 and 2008, leading to a major market correction and temporary Chaos. In both cases, the developed world experienced a nominal loss substantially higher than $25T (Trillion, or thousands of Billions) in market capitalization. If you missed them, here are the key conclusions of the report written in 2011 by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, even as this remarkable scenario continues to unfold (http://fcic.law.stanford.edu (​http:​/​​/​fcic.law.stanford.edu​)): 

“We conclude this financial crisis was avoidable.
We conclude widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision proved devastating to the stability of the nation’s financial markets.
We conclude dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at many systemically important financial institutions were a key cause of this crisis. 
We conclude a combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency put the financial system on a collision course with crisis.
We conclude the government was ill prepared for the crisis, and its inconsistent response added to the uncertainty and panic in the financial markets.
We conclude there was a systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics.
We conclude collapsing mortgage-lending standards and the mortgage securitization pipeline lit and spread the flame of contagion and crisis.
We conclude over-the-counter derivatives contributed significantly to this crisis.
We conclude the failures of credit rating agencies were essential cogs in the wheel of financial destruction.”

Hence, one of the world’s worst financial disasters, and probably the most expensive of all, appears to have been the direct result of human actions, inactions, and misjudgments: “Widespread failures in financial regulation; dramatic breakdowns in corporate governance; excessive borrowing and risk-taking; ill prepared policy makers; and systemic breaches in accountability”. All contributed to a tragedy whose final outcome will inevitably be a major shift in the power structure of the world.

Having spent the last ten years observing, conceptualizing and formalizing financial markets behavior (Choffray, 2009a, 2009b, 2011b), I could not agree more with the conclusions of this report. As surprising as it might appear, aside from the dates and the amounts involved, the report’s conclusions do not differ significantly from the observations made years ago by Galbraith (1994) in his Short History of Financial Euphoria, or by Clews (1923) during his Fifty Years in Wall Street !... Market participants (whether physical investors’ crowds or internet-based flash hordes…) tend to reproduce the same behaviors and misjudgments over time. Some modesty, serious monitoring of market developments, and a reasonable knowledge of economic history and financial theory, could probably have prevented falling into the 2008 trap. Did investors really have no other choice than: “Keep on dancing, as long as the music was playing?”

The answer is evidently “No”. Government, financial market supervisors, banks, credit rating agencies, institutional and private investors, and even consumers had the possibility to act differently. Information was widely and readily available on the internet on the huge imbalances accumulating at different levels in the markets (e.g. www.zerohedge.com (​http:​/​​/​www.zerohedge.com​), www.marketoracle.co.uk (​http:​/​​/​www.marketoracle.co.uk​)). Descriptive and analytical tools were at the tip of the fingers of any curious mind. Backtracking and simulation systems could have been used to understand market conditions and anticipate increasingly likely disruptions. But..., as the head of a now defunct European bank, told me then: “There is nothing more exciting than riding a wild bull.”

Now, that we have passed Pearl Harbor, according to Warren Buffett (2008), and that June 30, 2011 will probably be remembered as D-day (Gross, 2011), investors have to get ready for the next, and certainly not final, fight! The “battalions” and “weapon systems” are already in place (FED’s currency swap lines, ECB’s Long-Term Refinancing Operations [LTRO]…). Some “unmanned drones” are patrolling over extended market zones, ready to spot unusual activity and jam communications. “At the end of the day, it is the perception of what happened that matters more than what actually happened” (US Joint Force Command, 2010). We live in a world where market participants are continually learning, adapting and “feigning to feign.” (Zizek, 2002)

This WebPaper is an abridged, and simplified, version of a chapter originally published in French (Choffray, 2011a). It presents a simple, seven-step approach, to surviving on World Street. Its goal is to help you design efficient investment strategies while protecting your assets. It is based on a personal research conducted over the last ten years, involving hundreds of observations, investment simulations and actual decisions. World Street refers to a global, hybrid network of market places and market participants, characterized by: high frequency trading system; over leveraged shadow entities and hedge funds; flash crashes; incompetent management; reverse merger frauds; dot bubble 2.0 IPOs; and stealth central banks’ actions. Market participants are mostly software applications (Bots) that run automated investment tasks, increasingly frequently through the Internet. Such bots generate today more than sixty percent of all transactions


2.	A simple model of stock markets’ response

Stock markets have become extremely complex. They rely on networks of networks (and other ECN: Electronic Communication Networks, ATS: Alternative Trading Systems…), linking a diverse set of market platforms (and other dark pools…), to various participants and trading systems (and other MM: Market Makers, SLP: Supplemental Liquidity Providers, HFTS: High Frequency Trading Systems…) through the internet. 

There is a rhythm (frequency and amplitude…) in most human-engineered dynamic processes. But, understanding the rhythm of such a complex system requires the use of at least one aggregate indicator of actual investment behavior - as characterized by the price and volume of a representative sample of assets and assets’ classes -, and one descriptor of investors’ anticipations (or aversion to risk), as characterized by their desire to hedge against the uncertainty surrounding the actual value and the liquidity of their holdings.

Here, I suggest using what I have tentatively called a Market Conditions Matrix (See exhibit 1). This is a two-dimensional typology of a reference market’s observable stages of development. It is based on the MACD analysis of a pair of indicators reflecting actual investment behavior (e.g. SPY) and the associated measure of fear or risk aversion (e.g. VIX).






Exhibit 1: Market Conditions Matrix, based on investors’ actual behavior and anticipations (fear). (Source: Choffray 2011a).


Technically, SPY is an Exchange Traded Fund, or synthetic asset, that provides investors with the exact performance of the Standard & Poor’s 500 index (S&P500). The latter replicates the market capitalization of the five hundred largest American industrial and financial corporations (see: www.nyse.com (​http:​/​​/​www.nyse.com​), for a precise definition). VIX is an index that reflects the performance of a portfolio of short term Put options on the S&P500 (see: www.cme.com (​http:​/​​/​www.cme.com​), for a precise definition). Hence, it measures fear or volatility. In a real life investment situation, similar analyses should be run with at least two other pairs of indicators: DIA/VXD and QQQ/VXN, to better understand the specific behavior of the market for very large businesses (Dow Jones Industrial Average) and for high-tech companies (Nasdaq-100).

It appears that the market regularly cycles through four stages, corresponding to different risk structures for the investor, and requiring adaptation of his strategy: alternating between an essentially off-market position (Stage 1): gradual re-entry into the market in the form of selective buying (Stage 2); proactive portfolio management (Stage 3); and selective selling of mature positions (Stage 4). For highly risk averse investors, a viable strategy might be to concentrate only on Stage 3, which usually happens three or four times a year, for a period of three to six weeks.















3.	Unleash the power of Exchanged Traded Funds

Over the last ten years, ETFs (Exchange Traded Funds) have become one or the most important investment vehicles. ETFs are synthetic, or virtual, assets that give investors direct access to the performance of an underlying basket of individual assets (stocks and/or indices). Spiders (SPY), Diamonds (DIA) and Cubes (QQQ) have become common terms on World Street. These ETFs reproduce in real time the variation of the Standard & Poor 500 index, the Dow Jones 30 index and the Nasdaq 100 index. They are ideal tools to diversify, balance, or hedge, an existing portfolio.

More recently, just before our world experienced its worst economic crisis, financial innovators engineered new technologies aimed at producing inverse and leveraged ETFs. These tools allow investors to modify and/or increase their leverage structurally rather than financially. Most of these ETFs are characterized by a high level of liquidity. And, as of now, the counterparty risk appears to be non-significant.

Investment technology providers such as ProShares, RydexFunds, VelocityShares and other DirexionFunds (see associated internet sites), offer products that generate twice (SSO) or three times (UPRO) the performance of the S&P500 index. Inverse ETFs like SH, SDS, and SPXU generate the inverse, double inverse and triple inverse variation of the same index. Similar tools are available for most markets in the world and sector indices. For more information, see: www.etfdb.com (​http:​/​​/​www.etfdb.com​), www.etfzone.com (​http:​/​​/​www.etfzone.com​), www.etfmarketpro.com (​http:​/​​/​www.etfmarketpro.com​). 

















Exhibit 2: A sample of ETFs: direct (100%); direct with leverage (200%); inverse, with or without leverage (-100%; -200%).

Today, an experienced investor could possibly base his strategy on any set, or subset, of currently available ETFs (index-based, sector-based, commodity-based, Treasury-based, and their inverse, with or without leverage). If he so chooses, the key to success is to identify, as precisely as possible, the current stage of development of the reference market, and to adapt his portfolio accordingly. Special attention should be given to leveraged ETFs, if they not are used in the very short term. These tools tend generate exponentially growing losses in case of error, which could significantly affect total return. “An introduction to leveraged and inverse funds” is a must read. http://www.proshares.com/media/documents/geared_investing.pdf (​http:​/​​/​www.proshares.com​/​media​/​documents​/​geared_investing.pdf​). 

So, it appears that on the markets, “Money never gets lost, it simply changes pockets…” When the markets collapsed in H2 of 2008, losing more than $20T (Trillion, thousands of Billions) in world cap, investors who positioned themselves on inverse - or inverse leveraged - ETFs did make a “killing”. They were not speculators, as some tended to label them. They were simply well informed and well prepared investors, totally focused on the single most important objective that they might have had: Protect their assets. 












4.	Target economic value adding businesses

At a business level, the art and science of management could easily be summarized in two principles:

1.	Never make any decision that could potentially have a negative impact on shareholders’ equity,
2.	Never, NEVER, forget principle one.

Shareholders’equity, or stockholders’equity, represents the financial resources that a company receives from its stockholders. It comprises paid-in capital, retained earnings, and additional paid-in capital (capital premiums). Alternatively, it can be calculated as the firm’s total assets or liabilities (total balance sheet), minus its debts. Stockholders' equity is often referred to as the book value of a company. 

Two measures of management efficiency are commonly used to assess how productive, and creative, management is in deploying a firm’s financial resources: return on equity (roe) and return on assets (roa). Return on equity is the ratio of net income to stockholders equity. Return on assets is the ratio of net income to total assets or liabilities (total balance sheet).

Both ratios are elegant measures of how efficient management is in creating additional resources from the funds that were made available by the business partners: shareholders and/or debt holders. Unsurprisingly, the former will tend to concentrate on roe, and the latter on roa. A rough estimate of the leverage of a company - i.e. the importance of debt financing - is provided by the (dlevel) ratio: roe/roa.

As any strategy should take into consideration the opportunity cost associated with the choices it entails, these measures of efficiency should be compared with the cost of access to the corresponding resources: the cost of capital (cc) and the weighted average cost of capital (wacc), respectively. In simple terms, the cost of capital (cc) can be viewed as the sum of the refinancing rate for a lender (e.g: prime rate) and a risk premium. It also corresponds to the rate of return that shareholders would receive if they invested in a different business with a similar risk profile.

The Economic value added (eva) is the difference between roe and cc. If a company is consistently creating economic value, it is strategically independent and financially autonomous. If it is not eva positive, it will lose its shareholders who will understandably prefer to generate the same return from less risky investments (e.g. long term bonds or sovereigns, although some of these have been rather unsafe recently!). When eva is negative - unfortunately, a common occurrence today -, which means that a company’s operations do not recurrently cover its cost of capital, the board has no other choice than to restructure it (shed assets, reduce leverage…). 





Exhibit 3: Economic value creation and leverage of a few businesses (Source: Yahoo/Finance/Key Statistics, 29/12/2011).


Given today’s cost of capital (around 7%, plus or minus 2%, depending on the sector) all of these companies appear to be creating economic value. Some of the youngest high tech firms are still slowly building up their operational and capital structure. Quite different strategies are observed in terms of leverage (dlevel).  











5.	Focus on growth generating companies

Like any other living organism, companies adapt, grow and proliferate, or disappear. Technically, businesses should always be seen as “growth generating processes” (highest priority goal), “subject to economic value creation” (binding constraint or “life insurance”). Their actual operational activity is of very limited interest (Choffray, 2003).

There are many dimensions along which to measure business growth, starting with revenue, market share, employment and, why not, office space. From an investment standpoint, however, none of these measures is satisfactory, as they do not necessary relate to the firm’s ability to build shareholders’ equity. 

The return on investment (roi) made through the purchase of a share, is a function of the present (discounted) value of the flow of net earnings that it generates. Assuming that these earnings grow at a constant rate, roi can be expressed as follows (Bodie et al, 1993):

roi = (e/p) + g, or

roi = (1/per) + g,

with
*	roi		: Return On Investment,
*	e		: eps, or fully diluted Earnings Per Share,
*	p		: price per share, stock price,
*	g		: eps : eps Growth (trailing twelve months basis),
*	per		: Price Earnings Ratio = p/e.

All other things being equal, the financial performance of an investment is inversely related to its per, and directly related to its fully diluted (stock options included) eps growth rate. 

For a rational investor, the roi of any investment should cover his opportunity cost, i.e. his cost of access to capital. So, any increase in the reference interest rate (e.g. prime rate), and/or in the risk premium, will translate into added pressure in terms of roi. For listed companies, assuming they cannot accelerate earnings growth, this new requirement will lead to a drop in their per, and in their market capitalization.

It should be kept in mind that earnings growth is not necessarily related to operational growth. The way management monitors costs, whatever their nature, is of the utmost importance. Businesses should only concentrate on sales - or market share -, growth as long as it translates into earnings growth. Non profitable growth should be banned, even if in some parts of the world such an assertion appears to be “politically incorrect”.

Exhibit 4 provides the revenue growth rate (rev), the earnings growth rate eps, as well as an estimate of management focus on costs (cfocus = eps/rev) for our sample of companies. Again, we assume that these values are reliable and valid. In case of doubt, they should be estimated from the latest information published by the Securities and Exchange Commission (i.e. 10-Q, 10-K filings, EDGAR database, www.sec.gov (​http:​/​​/​www.sec.gov​)).





Exhibit 4: Revenue, earnings growth and cost focus for our sample of businesses (Source: Yahoo/Finance/Key Statistics, 29/12/2011).


Stock-splits are the natural consequence of a sustained level of earnings growth. Most high tech, high growth, companies avoid paying dividends. They prefer to keep the financial resources they generate internally, in the form of retained earnings, to finance future development (internal and/or external), and growth. These shares are credited to existing shareholders, and reward them for their loyalty. 









6.	Get good value for your money

“Buy low, sell high” is the key to success… But, it’s easier said than done! The problem arises from the fact that “Markets can stay irrational longer than most investors can stay solvent”, as noted by J.M. Keynes.

Assessing the fair value, or the intrinsic value, of an investment is a complex process requiring both expertise and experience. Expertise is needed to collect, validate, analyze, and extrapolate available information. Experience is required to balance a portfolio in terms of value creation, earnings growth, leverage, and cost focus of the underlying businesses. No single method is consistently the best over time. And that’s probably what makes investing an art rather than a science.

In the absence of a magic formula, a reasonable approach is to make use of some key valuation ratios, available in real time on the internet. Most financial sites provide estimates of the price earnings ratio (per), the price to sales ratio (psr), the price to book ratio, and the price to operational cash flow ratio. These ratios are usually computed on a trailing twelve months (TTM) basis, adding robustness to their estimates. A first guess at the value a company provides an investor with, stems from the comparison of its valuation ratios to those of similar companies, or to those of the market (as of the end of December 2011, the per of the S&P500 is around 13).

The “best” approach at assessing “good value for the investor’s money” should, in one way or another, balance the price he pays with the growth he gets. His initial asset position, as well as his risk aversion, should probably also be taken into consideration. Hence, a simple, non-compensatory, multidimensional model is probably part of the solution. Such a model implies that an underperformance on one criterion cannot be compensated by an over performance on another one.   

Exhibit 5 provides two key valuation ratios for our previous sample of companies: psr and per. It also gives their beta coefficient, a measure of the tendency that an asset has to historically amplify or attenuate the underlying market variations. Although these estimates were obtained from Yahoo/Finance/KeyStatistics, and can be considered as reasonably reliable, a more rigorous analysis should make use of the most recent information available at the SEC.





Exhibit 5: Key valuation ratios for our sample of businesses. 
(Source: Yahoo/Finance/Key Statistics, 29/12/2011).


Simultaneous consideration of the information available on Value creation (Exhibit 3), on Growth generation (Exhibit 4), and on Market valuation (Exhibit 5), could lead to the development of very complex models of investments evaluation and selection. But, it probably makes sense to first consider the companies that provide the best value for the money on the basis of their peg ratio: ACOM, FSLR, IRBT and PCLN. Among them, ACOM, IRBT, and PCLN are best in class in terms of Return on Investment (roi). Based on their beta, companies like ACOM and IRBT should rather be favored in an up trending environment, while PCLN should prove less volatile in a down trending situation. Finally, attention to management focus on cost (cfocus), and to leverage (dlevel), leads to isolate IRBT.










7.	Avoid being the “sucker”

“It’s the economy, stupid”
B. Clinton, 1992.

No…, it’s a war, fool!

The history of the world is the history of wars. Empires follow empires with a surprising regularity. The causes of their collapse are well documented (Bossuet, 1664) and reflect, among others, human beings’ tendency to rest on their successes, their innate taste for opulence, and their inclination to trust others for their protection…

On the markets, again: Money never gets lost, it changes pockets! That’s during the period which precedes what people call a crisis, a correction, or a recession, that smart investors design counter-intuitive strategies that will lead, after the tragedy, to the desired change in the political, economic and/or financial power structure. Associating that change to the observed event is always a mistake. Human beings excel in their ability to “feign to feign” (Zizek, 2005). The most important things are usually invisible and unknown to most. Businesses are often playthings for bigger forces. 
    
What we are going through today is the economic and financial equivalent of a major war. The goal is to control the industrial and the financial structure of the world to come. If you had a doubt as to the determination of the western world to protect its values, and the integrity of the industrial and the military structure on which they rest, you should probably give it up. According to Bloomberg (Pittman et Ivry, 2009), the US government and the Federal Reserve have spent, or are ready to spend, since the beginning of this crisis, more than $12.8T (Trillion or thousands of Billions). This is close to their Gross National Product ($14.2T in 2008) and represents more than ten times the amount of money in circulation : $899.8B (Billion). It is by far the most expensive war they have had to fight. The cost of the Second World War approached $4.2T, the Vietnam war $686B, and the invasion of Irak $650B (Daggett, 2008).

As of today, the United States, and to a lesser extent Europe, have protected the key players of the financial sector. They have restructured the most vulnerable industries, and are currently struggling to refinance public (sovereign) debt. Finally, they are sending their creditors a strong message as to their intentions in terms of monetary policy. Lempereur (2009) provides a synthesis of the key dimensions of these exceptional circumstances and of the consequences they are likely to have in the future.

Sunzi and Sun Bin (2004), in The Art of War (476–221 BC), address the strategy of war in its broadest sense. Their theory stresses the necessity to: understand the enemy; keep the initiative; adapt to the battlefield; engage only when sure of victory; act swiftly; win fast; be indifferent to any form of recognition; stay unpredictable; and avoid total destruction. It also stresses the importance of diplomacy and cultivating relationships with other nations. Each of these advices can readily be transposed to the world of investing. 

Managers and board members, as probably university professors, tend to distinguish themselves more by their patience than by their competence. Unlike professors, however, most of them seem to ignore it. « Only invest in businesses that could be run by fools, one day they will » notes Warren Buffett. The incompetence and the irresponsibility of many leaders are well documented, particularly during periods of financial euphoria (Galbraith, 1994). In his prescient novel “Money” which unfolds during the Second French Empire, Zola (1919) describes the terrible effects of fraudulent management, of the promotion of “concept” companies, of the negligence of board members, of the greed and corruption of investors, and of the chronic weakness of the law!


















8.	Respect crowds’ exuberance (or gloominess)

As we all know: “Life is a comedy” (Erasmus, 1989). Periodically, however, it becomes a tragedy…

At the end of the nineteenth century, Gustave le Bon produced his fundamental work on the psychology of crowds (Le Bon, 1963). Technology aside, things haven’t changed fundamentally since then. As markets behave like crowds, investors should better understand how they function. Once formed, a crowd is not amenable to any form of rational thinking. It is, on purely psychological grounds, in a mental state that reminds hypnosis. Well managed, their members can be influenced, and/or manipulated, with simple images and messages. They “wake up” and get back to normal life through a painful process that leads them to relinquish their illusions. That’s why crowds, if they are managed thoughtfully, are only efficient at… destruction.

In a short, but insightful, book on the history of financial euphoria, Galbraith (1994) dissects investors’ psychology and behavior. The regularity - every seven to ten years - with which financial markets fall into dementia is amazing. As is the conjunction of factors leading to it: a major financial innovation; the incompetence of market participants; the arrival of a new generation of investors; a tendency to self-delusion and self-righteousness; the excessive use of leverage; and the ignorance (or forgetting) of history. What we experienced over the last three years is simply an additional example of what happens when people, and not only financial institutions, lose their sense of reality. This naturally leads to a search for culprits and other scapegoats (Girard, 1978), to the development of new myths and proscriptions, and, finally, to a new flight from reality...

Henry Clews (1923), a well-respected investment banker and happy owner of a beautiful castle on the French Riviera, rightfully stressed the importance of experience in the design and execution of success-oriented investment strategies: 

"Few gain sufficient experience in Wall Street until they reach that period of life in which they have one foot in the grave. When this time comes these old veterans usually spend long intervals of repose at their comfortable homes, and in times of panic, which recur oftener than once a year, these old fellows will be seen in Wall Street, hobbling down on their canes to their brokers' offices. Then they always buy good stocks to the extent of their bank balances, which have been permitted to accumulate for just such an emergency. The panic usually rages until enough of these cash purchases of stock is made to afford a big 'rake in.' When the panic has spent its force, these old fellows, who have been resting judiciously on their oars in expectation of the inevitable event, quickly realize, deposit their profits with their bankers, or the over plus thereof, after purchasing more real estate that is on the upgrade, for permanent investment, and retire for another season to the quietude of their splendid homes and the bosom of their happy families”. 









Many sources can be used to better understand the dynamics of financial markets and the incidence of geopolitical events on their evolution. Among the best-informed, I would recommend reading Bernanke (www.federalreserve.gov (​http:​/​​/​www.federalreserve.gov​)), Draghi (www.ecb.eu (​http:​/​​/​www.ecb.eu​)), Buffett (www.berkshirehathaway.com (​http:​/​​/​www.berkshirehathaway.com​)), Soros (www.georgesoros.com (​http:​/​​/​www.georgesoros.com​)), Gross (www.pimco.com (​http:​/​​/​www.pimco.com​)), Grantham (www.gmo.com (​http:​/​​/​www.gmo.com​)), Fleckenstein (www.fleckensteincapital.com (​http:​/​​/​www.fleckensteincapital.com​)) and Jubak (www.jubackpicks.com (​http:​/​​/​www.jubackpicks.com​) ). Some general purpose information sites should also be consulted: www.bloomberg.com (​http:​/​​/​www.bloomberg.com​), www.reuters.com (​http:​/​​/​www.reuters.com​), www.cnbc.com (​http:​/​​/​www.cnbc.com​), www.zerohedge.com (​http:​/​​/​www.zerohedge.com​) and other www.marketoracle.co.uk (​http:​/​​/​www.marketoracle.co.uk​). Finally, a few specialized sites may be helpful : www.imf.org (​http:​/​​/​www.imf.org​), www.ocde.org (​http:​/​​/​www.ocde.org​), www.world-exchanges.org (​http:​/​​/​www.world-exchanges.org​), www.nabe.com (​http:​/​​/​www.nabe.com​), www.conference-board.org (​http:​/​​/​www.conference-board.org​), www.ny.frb.org/research/global_economy (​http:​/​​/​www.ny.frb.org​/​research​/​global_economy​), www.cia.gov (​http:​/​​/​www.cia.gov​), and www.fas.org/man/eprint/joe2010.pdf (​http:​/​​/​www.fas.org​/​man​/​eprint​/​joe2010.pdf​), the US Joint Force Command Report.






One of the world’s worst financial crises, and probably the most expensive of all, appears to have been the direct result of human actions, inactions, and misjudgments. All of these contributed to a multi trillion dollar tragedy, and a potential major change in the power structure of the world.

This paper presents a simple, seven-step approach, to surviving on World Street: an investment environment characterized by high frequency trading system, over leveraged shadow entities and hedge funds, flash crashes, incompetent management, reverse merger frauds, dot bubble 2.0 IPOs, and stealth central banks’ actions. Its goal is to help you design efficient investment strategies while protecting your assets. It is based on a personal research conducted over the last ten years, involving hundreds of observations, investment simulations, and actual decisions. 

This hybrid internet-based network of market places and market participants (including bots) is a very dangerous place to be. Your first loss is always your best loss. Even if the determinants of success have not changed fundamentally over time, internet helping, anyone can put the full power of information, of analytics, and of the markets’ dynamics, on his side. Hopefully, the principles outlined here, once validated through your own decisions and observations, should help you sail into the wind!

And, to start the new year on a positive note…, let me share with you five things that ZeroHedge (2012) believes will happen soon: “Volatility in 2012 will break all records, retail investors will continue to leave markets in droves, correlations will remain at all-time highs, politicians will suckle more than ever at the Wall Street teat knowing well the party is soon ending, and lastly, central planning will hit unseen levels. Everything else is noise and soundbites.” 
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Principle 1. Never fight the market. Identify its current stage of development through an MACD analysis based on the following pairs of descriptors: SPY/VIX, QQQ/VXN and DIA/VXD. Adapt your investment strategy accordingly.

Principle 2. Focus on Stage 1 and 3 of the Market cycle. Make intelligent use of available ETFs: Stage 1, inverse ETFs; Stage 3, direct ETFs. Use structural leverage depending on your investment horizon and your level of “real time” implication.

Principle 3. Investment candidates (businesses) should generate a recurrent level of return on equity (roe), greater that their cost of access to capital (cc), and ideally greater than your assets growth objective. Verify that their leverage (dlevel) doesn’t threaten their strategic independence and financial autonomy.

Principle 4. Investment candidates (businesses) should generate a high level of earnings growth (eps), itself the result of solid operational growth (rev). To reduce the risk of future disappointment, (eps) and (rev) should ideally be greater than roe. Hence: (eps > rev > roe).

Principle 5. Focus on solid businesses (roe, eps, eps > roe) that offer good value for the money (low peg) on historical terms, as well as on the basis of analysts’ estimates. Stay emotionless when valuation ratios (per, psr, peg) reach senseless levels.

Principle 6. Respect quarterly cycles. Invest in solid businesses (roe, eps, eps > roe, low peg, recurrent over performance) at the end of their consolidation (bottoming) process. Avoid being invested when they release their quarterly report.

Principle 7. Sit down, shut up and think. Prepare investment decisions weeks and months in advance. Build watch lists of target companies with a stock screener. Contribute to God’s work: Buy despair, sell hope!
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